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Abstract
This article analyses the monetary policy conduct framework in the euro area following 
the end of net purchases under the financial asset purchase programme. First, there is a 
review of the monetary policy measures since 2014 and of the ECB’s announcements on 
the future course of its instruments, comparing the recent changes in euro area monetary 
policy with the normalisation of US monetary conditions initiated by the Federal Reserve 
in 2013. Second, the authors analyse the main instruments currently available to the ECB 
(forward guidance on interest rates and its asset portfolio reinvestment policy), and 
discuss how both instruments provide monetary stimulus in the current setting.
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THE EUROSYSTEM’S MONETARY POLICY FOLLOWING THE END OF NET ASSET 
PURCHASES
The authors of this article are Óscar Arce, Galo Nuño and Carlos Thomas of the Directorate General Economics, 
Statistics and Research.
On 13 December 2018, the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council decided to end 
net purchases of financial assets under its APP (Asset Purchase Programme). At the same 
time, the Council announced its intention to continue fully reinvesting the principal payments 
from maturing securities under the Programme for an extended period after the date on which 
it begins to raise its policy interest rates and, in any event, for as long as necessary to maintain 
favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation.
The end of net purchases under the APP marks the beginning of a new phase for the 
Eurosystem’s monetary policy. In this phase, forward guidance, accompanied by the 
reinvestment policy, has become the main monetary policy instrument.
The aim of this article is to analyse the monetary policy conduct framework in this new 
phase. In this connection, it briefly reviews the Eurosystem’s monetary policy since 2014 
and the Federal Reserve’s experience in normalising its monetary policy, initiated in 2013. 
Finally, there is a review of the current instruments available to the Eurosystem and an 
analysis of its capacity to promote the maintenance of easy monetary and financial 
conditions and to boost inflation in the current economic situation.
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, the ECB and other central banks have 
complemented their operating frameworks with several unconventional monetary policy 
tools. Pre-crisis, the ECB’s basic instruments were its policy interest rates, through which 
it sought to control short-term rates on money markets, summarised in indicators such as 
the EONIA.1 This monetary policy signal would be propagated throughout the financial 
system, influencing a wide range of financial conditions and, finally, macroeconomic 
dynamics, including consumer prices.
During the financial crisis, this operating framework proved insufficient. This was due to the 
dislocations in certain segments of the financial system, which hampered the transmission of 
monetary policy, and to the fact that the duration and scale of the crisis obliged the ECB to 
lower its deposit facility rate to 0%. The unconventional monetary policy measures introduced 
by the ECB prior to June 2014 focused chiefly on resolving the first of these problems, i.e. on 
repairing the monetary policy transmission mechanism. These measures included, for example, 
the provision of long-term liquidity to the banking sector and asset purchases in market 
segments that were not operating correctly, through the securities market programme (SMP).
As from June 2014, the ECB gradually introduced a series of measures aimed not only at 
improving monetary policy transmission but also at bolstering the expansionary stance of 
monetary policy. It did so against a background of strong easing in the inflation rate, and 
of its expected medium-term values, accompanied by some slowing in economic growth. 
The measures spanned three complementary areas: (i) the introduction of negative interest 
Introduction
The Eurosystem’s 
monetary policy measures 
in the period 2014-2018
1  These benchmark interest rates are: the interest rate on the main refinancing operations (MROs), the rate on the 
deposit facility (DFR) and the rate on the marginal lending facility (MLF). The EONIA (Euro Overnight Index 
Average) is the main indicator of overnight interbank loan rates in the euro area.
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rates, (ii) communication policy regarding the future course of monetary policy and (iii) the 
resumption and intensification of the expansion of the Eurosystem balance sheet (see 
Chart 1).
Firstly, the ECB moved its interest rates into negative territory in June 2014 by placing the 
deposit facility rate at -0.10%.
The second facet of the ECB’s monetary policy implementation in recent years has been a 
systematic inclusion in its communication of guidance about the future course of its 
monetary policy. This instrument has been applied both in the case of conventional and 
unconventional measures. It has helped emphasise the expansionary stance of monetary 
policy, providing an additional stimulus by contributing to anchoring agents’ expectations 
about the future course the ECB would follow for its main instruments, reducing the so-
called term premia of medium and long-term interest rates. In the case of interest rates, 
forward guidance initially involved announcing that rates would hold at “current or lower 
levels” for an “extended period of time”. As from March 2016, the ECB linked for the first 
time the future path of rates to the duration of the APP programme, reinforcing its previous 
formulation with the expression “and well beyond the horizon of our net purchases”. In 
June 2018, together with the Governing Council foretelling the end of net purchases as 
SOURCES: IFS Datastream, ECB and Banco de España.
The ECB has introduced three types of unconventional monetary policy measures since 2014: i) negative interest rates; ii) forward guidance; and iii) the 
resumed and intensified expansion of the Eurosystem balance sheet.
SINCE 2014, THE ECB HAS INTRODUCED NEW UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY MEASURES CHART 1
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from December that year, a release was launched for the first time on future interest rates 
linked to a specific time (approximately), with the announcement of its expectation that 
there would be no rate rises “at least through the summer of 2019”.2 This element of 
forward guidance, which when introduced managed to put back the expected moment for 
the first rise in interest rates (see Chart 2), has generally proven effective when setting 
agents’ expectations about the minimum horizon in which such a rise may take place.3
Thirdly, in June 2014 the ECB introduced the targeted long-term refinancing operations 
(TLTROs, reintroduced in the March 2016 Council as TLTRO-II). These operations 
acknowledged the importance of bank intermediation in the euro area, enabling institutions 
to fund themselves long-term – with maturities of up to 4 years – under conditions that 
were favourable but linked to lending granted to the non-financial private sector performing 
dynamically. Moreover, the ECB decided in January 2015 to introduce an expanded asset 
purchase programme with a view to impacting overall euro area financial conditions more 
directly.4
The APP programme was activated in March 2015 with public and private bond purchases 
for a total value of €60 billion per month over an initial time horizon running to September 
2016. Given the need to prolong the monetary stimulus, the programme was recalibrated 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The intersection of the "+10 bp" horizontal line (i.e. EONIA as at 14 June 2018 plus 10 bp) with the OIS curve at each reference date may be interpreted as the 
market's estimation of the future time (in months, as from the reference date) at which the first rise in the DFR from its current level is expected. This is under the 
dual assumption that this rise: i) will be 10 bp, and ii) will cause an increase by the same amount in the EONIA indicator that acts as a reference for OIS contracts. 
According to the chart, the Governing Council's announcement on 14 June 2018 delayed the expected time of the first rise in the DFR by approximately 2 months.
Following the ECB's announcements, the EONIA yield curve shifted rightwards. That reflects a delay in market expectations about the first rise in rates.
THE ECB'S FORWARD GUIDANCE IN JUNE 2018 SUCCESSFULLY SHIFTED EXPECTATIONS OF THE FIRST  
RISE IN RATES
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2  This time reference was supplemented as follows: “and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure that the 
evolution of inflation remains aligned with the current expectations of a sustained adjustment path”. With slight 
changes, this formulation has been  maintained following subsequent Governing Council meetings.
3  The OIS (Overnight Indexed Swap) curve is shaped by the price of swap derivatives based on the future course 
of the EONIA at different future horizons. The instantaneous OIS forward curve reflects the EONIA interest rates 
that should arise at each future moment for which the swaps do not entail a payment from one party to the other. 
This curve reflects both expectations about the future level of the EONIA rate  and the term premium at different 
horizons. Therefore, this curve is an approximate estimate of the future level of the EONIA. 
4  In late 2014 the ECB had already introduced asset-backed securities and covered bond purchase programmes 
(ABSPP y CBPP3, under which the ECB purchases securitisations and collateralised bonds, respectively), but on 
a far lesser scale than the public securities purchase programme (PSPP).
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on several occasions. Some changes extended beyond the time the programme was in 
force. These altered the size of monthly purchases (which reached up to €80 billion) and 
extended the range of eligible assets (including, for example, corporate bonds under the 
CSPP programme, introduced in June 2016).  From April 2017, purchases were reduced to 
€60 billion, subsequently declining to €30 billion in January 2018 and €15 billion in October 
later that year. Finally, in December 2018, the Governing Council confirmed the end of net 
purchases, previously anticipated in June that year (subject to a favourably trending 
inflation outlook). Overall, the monetary stimulus generated via the TLTROs and the APP 
was on a sizable scale, which entailed a far-reaching change both in the size and 
composition of the Eurosystem balance sheet.5  
Given that the unconventional monetary policy measures applied in recent years by the 
ECB are new, finding precedents on how the monetary policy normalisation process might 
unfold in the euro area is not straightforward. Admittedly, the Governing Council has 
provided some guidance (described at the start of the article) on the potential duration of 
investments and their link to the beginning of the rise in interest rates; but the strategy for 
any ECB monetary policy normalisation may only evolve in the future insofar as the 
sustained adjustment of inflation towards rates compatible with the medium-term stability 
reference for prices (annual rate of inflation lower than, but close to, 2%) actually 
materialises. Against this background, it is worth analysing the experience of other central 
banks that are further ahead in their monetary policy normalisation process.
The most significant case in this respect is that of the United States Federal Reserve. From 
2008 to 2014, the Federal Reserve pursued a series of public and private asset purchase 
programmes (see Chart 3). In May 2013, it announced a reduction in the pace of purchases 
under those programmes still operating. This reduction began in January 2014, and 
continued until, in October that same year, the end of net purchases and a phase involving 
the full reinvestment of proceeds from maturing securities were reached, i.e. a similar 
situation to that of December 2018 in the euro area.
In September 2014, i.e. a month before the end of net purchases, the Federal Reserve 
announced a review of the principles of its monetary normalisation strategy. According to 
these principles, normalisation should take the form of rises in the short-term interest rate 
and a gradual and predictable reduction in the reinvestment of assets. As in the case of the 
euro area, the reduction in reinvestments would come about after the start of interest rate 
rises, and the time of that reduction would be determined by the path of economic and 
financial conditions.
The first interest rate rise in the United States finally came about in December 2015, more 
than one year after the discontinuation of net asset purchases. Thereafter, there were 
progressive rises in interest rates, up to the current band of 2.25-2.5%.
As regards the Federal Reserve balance sheet, the full reinvestment of assets purchased 
under the various quantitative easing programmes was maintained during the first phase 
of interest rate rises. In June 2017, the Federal Reserve announced that it expected to 
begin the reduction in reinvestments that same year, provided that the economy generally 
The US Federal Reserve’s 
experience
5  Mouabbi and Sahuc (2016), for example, calculate an average effect of the APP and TLTRO programmes of 
0.25% on prices and 0.56% on GDP between 2014 and 2016. Hutchinson and Smets (2017) estimate a 
cumulative impact of 0.5% on prices and 1.7% on GDP between 2016 and 2019. Banco de España (2016) 
estimates a cumulative impact of 1.2% on prices and 1.4% on GDP in the period 2015-2016.
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fared as had been forecast. The start of the balance sheet trimming was finally announced 
in September 2017, and began in October that year through the non-reinvestment of a 
portion of its maturing instruments, without specifying the completion date for this process 
or the objective size of the balance sheet in the long run. The Federal Reserve announced 
the possibility of resuming full reinvestment principal payments, and of altering the size 
and composition of the balance sheet if future economic conditions were to warrant a 
more accommodative policy.
In short, the sequence announced by the ECB Governing Council concerning the 
adjustment of interest rates and of reinvestments is similar, so far, to the strategy pursued 
by the Federal Reserve in the initial stages of its monetary normalisation process.   
As earlier discussed, the euro area’s monetary policy began to be tempered as the risks of 
a sharp and persistent deanchoring of medium and long-term inflation expectations eased. 
Initially, the ECB set about gradually reducing net asset purchases, until they stopped at 
end-2018. Since then, the ECB has switched the main element of its forward guidance 
from net purchases under the APP towards the future path of interest rates, to which the 
asset reinvestment policy must be added as a further instrument. By means of the use of 
both tools, the Eurosystem is in a position to provide broad-based monetary stimulus to 
euro area financial conditions and inflation, if necessary.
In the case of interest rates, as previously indicated the ECB foresees holding them at their 
current levels “at least through the summer of 2019” and  in any case for as long as 
necessary to ensure that the evolution of inflation remains aligned with the current 
expectations of a sustained adjustment path. This leaves the door open to changes that 
strengthen, where necessary, the positive effects on financial conditions. On one hand, 
The ECB’s monetary 
policy instruments in the 
current phase
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communication should be reinforced about the time at which the first rise in interest rates 
from their current levels (the so-called lift-off) should come about, either by delaying the 
future date before which such a rise would not be expected, in what has been called 
“calendar-based” guidance, or by linking this rise to actual inflation (or expected inflation, 
at a specific but not excessively distant horizon) reaching or exceeding a specific level, i.e. 
“state-contingent” guidance.6 On the other hand, it would be possible to offer guidance on 
the pace of subsequent interest rate rises, with the possibility of once again linking this 
pace to macroeconomic developments.7
In the case of full asset portfolio reinvestment, the December 2018 ECB Governing Council 
announced its intention to maintain this policy “for an extended period of time” following 
any initial rise in interest rates, in a link between both tools that has been called chained 
forward guidance. Once again, this formulation offers variations that might strengthen, 
where necessary, the stimulus effect of reinvestments. Firstly, there would be a possibility 
of specifying the precise meaning of “extended period of time” by setting a minimum 
duration of the reinvestment as from the first rise in rates;8 that would be a “quantitative” 
version of the above-mentioned chained forward guidance.9 . Secondly, it would be 
possible to announce changes in the composition of reinvestments in terms of residual 
maturity, with a view to increasing the degree of absorption of maturity risk by the 
programme and, therefore, the accommodative impact on the longer-dated segments of 
the yield curves. Further ahead, two possible options for reinforcing the positive effect of 
the reinvestments would be to specify both the pace of reduction of reinvestments once 
they ceased to be full and the duration of the ongoing shrinkage of the programme’s 
portfolio. In combination, both elements would offer information on the size of the 
Eurosystem’s balance sheet in the long term.
Beyond the qualitative arguments set out, it is worth quantifying, albeit tentatively, the 
possible macroeconomic effects of forward guidance on the path of interest rates and on 
asset reinvestments. Box 1 conducts a quantitative exercise, drawing on the dynamic 
general equilibrium model in Arce, Hurtado and Thomas (2016). The analysis suggests that 
both tools are potentially useful for stimulating economic activity and inflation in the euro 
area, especially when the announcements on the duration of reinvestments are 
accompanied by others on the future path of interest rates designed to boost the 
expansionary effect of reinvestments.10
In sum, the end of the ECB’s net asset purchases has ushered in a new phase in which 
forward guidance on interest rates and the reinvestment of proceeds from maturing assets 
have taken on the role of the main monetary stimulus tools. Both tools allow for changes 
 6  By way of example, in December 2012, the Federal Reserve used state-contingent guidance, announcing that 
it did not envisage raising interest rates while unemployment held above 6.5% and inflation and the attendant 
expectations remained stable.
 7  This possibility is discussed, for example, in Coeuré (2018).
 8  Naturally, this hypothetical change in communication would only entail further stimulus insofar as there were a 
lengthening of the reinvestment horizon in financial markets’ expectations.
 9  It would in principle also be possible to add state-contingent elements in the duration of investments, e.g. 
linking such duration to the course of inflation. However, the fact that communication of the lift-off of interest 
rates is already linked to the adjustment of inflation, along with the binding linkage of the reinvestment horizon 
to the time of such lift-off, means that a change of this nature would be somewhat redundant. In the future, once 
there is a rise in rates (or its date is specified), it would indeed be useful to link the reinvestment horizon to the 
path of inflation.
10  Specifically, the box considers a variation of forward guidance under which the central bank, at the time of 
announcing a specific duration of reinvestments, also commits to not bringing forward the time of the first rise 
in rates and to not accelerating the subsequent pace of rises as a result of the potential expansionary effect of 
the reinvestments on real activity and inflation.
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in their formulation aimed at strengthening this stimulus where necessary, for example in 
the event of a severe reversal in the trajectory of recovery of the economy and euro area 
inflation; indeed, it is possible to introduce other additional measures, as repeatedly 
asserted by various senior Eurosystem officials.11
21.2.2019.
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The aim of this box is to illustrate, in the context of a macroeconomic 
model, the effectiveness of the two main tools currently available 
to the ECB following the end of its net asset purchases: 
reinvestments and forward guidance on interest rates. In this 
connection, an analysis based on the dynamic general equilibrium 
model in Arce, Hurtado y Thomas (2016) is conducted. This model 
considers a monetary union with two blocks, respectively 
encompassing the “core” and the “peripheral” countries. In the 
model, the central bank can purchase long-term public debt as 
part of its “unconventional” monetary policy arsenal.1
The simulation exercise seeks to approach the current situation in 
the euro area by considering a negative shock that has prompted 
a severe enough recession for the short-term interest rate to have 
reached its lower bound. Against this background, the central 
bank implements a bond purchase programme (similar to the APP) 
for several quarters. Following the end of net purchases the 
interest rate holds at its lower bound, but its adjustment is 
expected to start after a few quarters. In this setting, an analysis is 
made of the effects of different announcements relating to the 
reinvestments horizon and the possible interaction with further 
announcements on the future path of interest rates.2
The middle panel of Chart 4 shows the dynamic impact on the 
monetary union’s aggregate GDP of announcing different 
reinvestment horizons, relative to the path of GDP in the case in 
which it is announced that there will be no reinvestments at the 
end of net purchases. In all instances, the impact is concentrated 
chiefly in the quarter in which the announcement is made.
The top panels in the chart show the impact on GDP and inflation 
at different horizons: (i) at the time of the announcement; (ii) the 
first year; and (iii) the first five years. For both variables the marginal 
effect of extending the reinvestment horizon tends to diminish 
over time. The reason is that, when the reinvestment horizon is 
short, the beneficial effects of the absorption of bonds by the 
central bank largely coincide with the period in which the nominal 
interest rate remains anchored at its lower bound; therefore, the 
conventional monetary policy does not undo – through an earlier 
and/or swifter normalisation path – the expansionary effects of the 
reinvestments on inflation and activity.3 However, when the 
reinvestment horizon extends beyond that period, prolonging 
reinvestments over more years is offset by the endogenous 
tightening of monetary policy; that is to say, the rise in rates 
induced by the increase in inflation and in GDP prompted by asset 
reinvestments.
One means of countering this loss in efficiency of reinvestment 
announcements is by combining them with guidance on the future 
path of interest rates. For example, take the instance where the 
central bank points to a rate normalisation path – in response to a 
progressive improvement in the macroeconomic situation — that 
is more gradual than what it would follow under normal conditions, 
such that it does not neutralise the expansionary effects of 
reinvestments with swifter rate rises. To formalise this notion in the 
model, we consider an alternative scenario under which the central 
bank undertakes to follow, for a short period after the start of the 
rate rises, the same interest rate path as in the scenario without 
reinvestments. Accordingly, this exercise enables the combined 
effect of reinvestments and forward guidance on interest rates to 
be quantified.
The lower panels of Chart 4 show how the impact of the various 
reinvestment announcements under this alternative scenario is 
clearly more acute. For example, for the longer reinvestment 
horizons, the effect at the time of the announcement on GDP and 
inflation is 0.6% and 0.5%, respectively, compared with 0.2% for 
both variables in the case without forward guidance (top panels).
This latter exercise therefore illustrates the need for the central 
bank to calibrate communication of the future path of interest 
rates and the asset reinvestment policy; the central bank must be 
mindful of the interactions between both these unconventional 
monetary policy instruments. The need for this overview is 
particularly pertinent in the current context of the Eurosystem 
where, as this article explains, communication of these two 
variables comprises the core of the monetary instruments the ECB 
currently uses.
BOX 1A QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATE OF THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF ASSET REINVESTMENT AND OF FORWARD 
GUIDANCE ON INTEREST RATES
1  These purchases have real effects owing to the existence of a 
segmentation in households similar to that considered in Chen, Cúrdia 
and Ferrero (2012). Hence, a fraction of households can only save in 
long-term public debt, while other households can also invest in short-
term debt, but they face adjustment costs if the composition of their 
portfolios diverges to some degree. A key parameter in the model is the 
elasticity of these adjustment costs. This parameter is calibrated to 
replicate the empirical results in Altavilla, Carboni and Motto (2015) on 
the response of long-term German and French sovereign debt yields to 
the announcement of the APP programme. This calibration is deliberately 
cautious, since the same empirical results encountered appreciably 
higher responses by the sovereign yields of other countries such as 
Spain and Italy to the APP announcement.
2  Following the announcement of the end of reinvestments, central bank 
bond holdings have diminished as such bonds progressively mature.
3  In the model, conventional monetary policy follows the so-called “Taylor 
rule”, which links the short-term interest rate to the monetary union’s 
inflation and real activity.
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BOX 1 A QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATE OF THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF ASSET REINVESTMENT AND OF FORWARD 
GUIDANCE ON INTEREST RATES (cont’d)
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4  EFFECTS OF REINVESTMENTS COMBINED WITH FORWARD GUIDANCE.
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Effects on euro area GDP and inflation of different reinvestment horizons, considering cases with/without guidance on interest rates following the first rise.
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Simulations based on the model in Arce, Hurtado and Thomas (2016).
